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In this paper we reexamine the Feldstein-Horioka finding of limited international capital 
mobility by using a broader view (i.e., including human capital) of investment and saving. We 
find that the Feldstein-Horioka result is impervious to this change. 
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suggestions. 1 Introduction
Models that emphasize the accumulation of human capital as an im-
portant determinant of growth have come into prominence during the
last two decades (see, for example, Lucas (1988), Azariadis and Drazen
(1990), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)). In these models the accumu-
lation of human capital is broadly similar to the accumulation of physical
capital since a rise in the accumulation of either type of capital increases
the amount of output that can be produced in the future. For example,
a household may increase its future consumption opportunities not only
by increasing its ownership of (claims to) physical capital, but it can
do so by increasing the human capital (and future earning opportuni-
ties) of its members. Accordingly, in the same way that an economy in
which the marginal productivity of physical capital is higher than the
world interest rate may use the opportunity to borrow internationally, an
economy in which the marginal productivity of human capital is higher
than the world interest rate, may decide to borrow internationally to
￿nance the possible excess of its desired human capital investment over
what domestic savings can allow. Consequently, by focusing on the nar-
rower view of capital (i.e., the one excluding human capital) one may
bias the results regarding the extent to which domestic savings act as a
constraint on domestic investment (broadly interpreted).
In this paper we reexamine the celebrated Feldstein and Horioka
(1980) [hereafter FH] ￿nding of limited international capital mobility
using this broader view of investment (and saving). We ￿nd that FH￿ s
results are impervious to this change.
2 Econometric Analysis
A large strand of the international macroeconomics literature provides
strong evidence for a high saving-investment correlation using both time
series and cross section techniques. This empirical regularity suggested
by FH has been interpreted as inconsistent with perfect capital mobility,
and has as a result triggered a vast response in the literature. In general,
one can distinguish among studies that aim at challenging the empirical
FH ￿nding [see Sinn (1992) and Caporale et al (2005)] and among those
that aim at reconciling this evidence with the existence of full capital
mobility [see Bayoumi (1990), Barro et al (1995), Baxter and Crucini
(1993) and Coackley et al (1996)].
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where I denotes gross domestic investment, S denotes gross domestic
2saving , Y denotes gross domestic product and i stands for the individual
country. All data are averages of the 1960-1974 period. FH ￿nd that ￿ is
close to one. The estimate for ￿ is 0.89 for the whole period and between
(0.87-0.91) for the various 5-year sub-sample periods. This ￿nding has
been characterized as a paradox since perfect capital mobility would
imply a value of ￿ close to zero. Subsequent studies have to a large
extent con￿rmed the FH paradox.
Our aim is to investigate whether ignoring a commonly neglected but
nevertheless important component of investment, namely the investment
in human capital has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the saving-investment cor-
relation. In order for our results to be comparable to FH￿ s result we
￿rst run equation (1) for our sample of 25 OECD countries and then we
compare the derived estimates of ￿ with those derived if the measure of
investment includes investment in human capital. To this purpose we
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where IT denotes gross domestic investment including investment in
human capital, Ih; IT=Y = I=Y + Ih=Y . We also adjust the total
saving ratio by excluding private sector education expenditures from
consumption expenditure. Thus, the measure of savings used in equation
(1) is augmented by adding to it the private expenditure on education
(Ihpr), and so S = S + Ihpr.
As an approximation of investment in human capital, Ih; we use
data for total expenditure for education from the OECD Education at
a Glance. Ih is de￿ned as total expenditure for education excluding
government expenditure designated for augmenting the physical capital
used for educational purposes. The reason is the latter expenditures
are already included in total investment as part of public investment.
Although these data exist for the 1992-2002 period there is very poor
coverage before 1997. Speci￿cally, there is no data coverage for 7 out of
the 25 countries of our sample prior to 1997. Ih is divided by GDP from
the OECD Economic Outlook. Gross national saving (as % of GDP),
S
Y , is also taken by OECD Economic Outlook. Finally, gross capital
formation (as % of GDP), I
Y , is from the World Bank, WDI.
Table 1 presents estimates of equation (1) for the 1985-2002 period.
3TABLE 1 : Feldstein-Horioka equation 1
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Notes: t-Statistics in parentheses.
Although one can observe a signi￿cant decrease in adjusted R2 after
1995; ￿ coe¢ cients are signi￿cant in all sub-samples. Our results are
consistent with Sinn (1992) and Taylor (1996) who observe a fall in ￿
in the 80￿ s. This fall has apparently become more signi￿cant after 1995
and it may well be related to the process of monetary integration among
European Union countries which culminated in the adoption of the Euro;
see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) for more details.
Our next step is to see whether including investment in human capital
as a part of total investment will a⁄ect the investment-saving correlation.













with an adjusted R2 of 0.19. Clearly our results indicate that there is
no signi￿cant change in the correlation between investment and savings
when human capital investment is taken into account. The estimate of
￿ is signi￿cant and very similar to the one reported in the last raw of
Table 1 whereas S
Y seems to explain 19% of the variation in IT
Y :
Some authors, including Feldstein (2005), have suggested that the
above results need to re-examined by taking into account the issue of
the country size e⁄ect: A large country relies less on external borrowing
since it is more diversi￿ed and national saving may have an impact on
world interest rate [see Harberger (1980), Dooley et al (1987) and Sinn
(1992)].
An obvious way of testing for a possible size e⁄ect is using the ratio of
the country￿ s GDP in total GDP as a weight in Weighted Least Squares
(WLS).1 This is equivalent to running OLS after multiplying all the data
1Alternatively one can assume that ￿ depends on the country size. However,
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It is straightforward to show that rejecting model (1) for model (4)
improves e¢ ciency if model (1) su⁄ers from heteroskedasticity. Since
V ar(u￿
i) = w2
iV ar(ui) and wi6=wj ; it is clear that if model (1) does
not su⁄er from heteroskedasticity, the use of WLS would introduce het-
eroskedasticity in our model. The White-heteroskedasticity test of equa-
tions (1) and (2) cannot reject homoskedasticity for all periods (apart
from the 91-95 period) at the one percent signi￿cance level, as reported in
the second and third columns of table 2. Furthermore, rerunning equa-
tions (1) and (2) using White￿ s heteroskedasticity consistent method
results in very similar standard errors apart from the 91-95 period. Still,
it is important to test whether equations (1) and (2) su⁄er from het-
eroskedasticity of the exact form which can be corrected by the use of
wi in WLS. This would be the case if
w
2
1V ar(u1) = w
2
2V ar(u2) = ::: = w
2
nV ar(un)
If wi is the right weight in an WLS regression then the squared resid-
uals of equations (1) and (2), RSQ; should be correlated with wi: Thus,
in order to test whether our initial model su⁄ers from heteroskedasticity
which can be corrected by the use of wi; we run simple OLS regres-
sions of RSQ on wi:The results are reported in the last columns of table
2. One can see that in all cases the coe¢ cient on wi is insigni￿cant.
This implies that using WLS would introduce heteroskedasticity in our
model for the majority of sub-periods, and for this reason we abstain
from further examination of this issue.2
recursive estimates of ￿ suggest that ￿ is stable across countries.
2Nevertheless, we have chequed whether our results depend on the use of WLS.
We found that the inclusion of human capital does not alter the saving-investment
correlation even if the latter is estimated by WLS. The results are available upon
request.
5TABLE 2 : Heteroskedasticity Tests
White test Ordinary Least Squares
equation (1) Dep var: RSQ of equation (1)
period F-statistic Probab. constant wi




















equation (2) Dep var: RSQ of equation (2)
F-statistic Probab. constant wi




Notes: t-Statistics in parentheses
Concluding, our analysis indicates that the traditional saving-investment
correlation does not alter signi￿cantly once we broaden the measure of
investment and saving by taking human capital into account. Moreover,
our analysis con￿rms the widespread belief, and the ￿nding of previous
studies, that the degree of international capital mobility has increased
signi￿cantly since the mid-seventies.
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